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Abstract
Purpose – To analyze the extent to which recognition of impairments 
in goodwill is associated with periods of negative results before these 
losses (big bath practices). To determine whether indebtedness and 
the capital market restrict the recognition of such losses in big bath 
practices.
Design/methodology/approach – Quantitative empirical study based 
on accounting and market data of companies listed on the Lisbon 
and Madrid stock exchanges (2007-2015), supported by multivariate 
regression models estimated using the generalized moments method 
(system GMM).
Findings – Impairment in goodwill is relevant in big bath practices, 
and there is great discretion in the use of this accrual. It can be 
concluded that companies adjust to capital market cycles. The positive 
relationship between the level of indebtedness and the impairment in 
goodwill suggests that any penalties from creditors do not condition 
the recognition of the impairments.
Originality/value – There is evidence of big bath practices being 
associated with companies with negative results and of the role of debt 
and capital markets as explanatory factors of big bath strategies that 
use impairments in goodwill.
Keywords – Goodwill impairment, Big bath, Indebtedness, Capital 
market
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1 Introduction 
The recognition of impairment losses 
in goodwill (designated by Imp_GW) appears 
in the literature because of the loss of capacity 
to generate cash in the future (Brütting, 2011; 
Olante, 2013). 
The verification and quantification tests of 
Imp_GW, according to International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 36, have economic impacts 
(Harris & Caplan, 2002), with reflections on 
the value of the company and the likelihood of 
recognizing the loss, its amount, and its timing. 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) identify three aspects 
that introduce high discretion into the recognition 
of Imp_GW: (i) GW’s effect on cash-generating 
units, (ii) estimation of the deducted value of 
future cash flows, and (iii) determination of fair 
value of assets and liabilities.
There is evidence of opportunistic earnings 
management through Imp_GW. In particular, big 
bath practices and income smoothing depend on a 
set of factors, in addition to the accounting choice 
permitted by the standards. Several authors have 
analyzed this issue in different contexts and using 
various methodologies, but they have not reached 
a consensual conclusion. For instance, Carvalho 
(2015), Jahmani, Dowling, and Torres (2010), 
and Li, Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang (2011) 
found Imp_GW is used as a tool for earnings 
manipulation, while Avallone and Quagli (2015), 
Castro (2012), and Jordan and Clark (2004, 
2015) do not confirm the hypothesis.
One other stream of research analyzes 
the factors inhibiting or facilitating earnings 
management policies, such as the capacity for 
credit negotiation (Beatty, Ramesh & Weber, 
2002; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Riedl, 2004), the 
market value of the company (Chen, Kohlbeck 
& Warfield, 2008; Giner & Pardo, 2015; Jarva, 
2009; Lee, 2011; Li et al., 2011; Li & Sloan, 
2017), and its indebtedness (Godfrey & Koh, 
2009; Hamberg, Paananen & Novak, 2011). The 
conclusions are neither consensual, nor robust.
The lack of consensus in the various 
studies, together with criticisms from preparers, 
auditors, regulators, and investors, have motivated 
the ongoing process of reviewing IFRS 3 and 
support the relevance of this research, which has 
the following objectives: (i) to analyze to what 
extent the recognition of Imp_GW is associated 
with periods where earnings before Imp_GW 
are negative (big bath practices); (ii) to assess to 
what extent debt and capital markets restrict the 
recognition of Imp_GW in big bath practices.
This paper focuses on comparing 
Portuguese and Spanish companies, based on a 
sample of 105 companies with securities listed 
on the stock exchange (2007-2015), and it 
adopts a quantitative methodology and dynamic 
multivariate regression models, using panel data.
A l though  the  compan i e s  app ly 
international accounting standards / international 
financial reporting standards (IAS / IFRS) and 
are influenced by code law in both countries 
(Knobble & Parker, 2004), there is evidence 
(e.g., Fernandes, Gonçalves, Warrior & Pereira, 
2016) of more conservative accounting behavior 
regarding the recognition of Imp_GW, in some 
companies, thus justifying some interest in this 
comparative analysis.
This study contributes to the literature 
in two ways: (i) by comparatively analyzing big 
bath practices in two countries, which apply 
the same accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) and 
are influenced by code law; (ii) by analyzing 
constraints to big bath practices that use Imp_
GW, such as debt and capital markets. 
Our findings suggest the existence of 
earnings management policies based on the 
recognition of Imp_GW. So one may question 
whether the annual assessment of these losses is 
the best criterion for evaluating GW as guarantor 
of credible financial information. Thus, the 
study encourages those bodies responsible 
for accounting standardization to analyze the 
efficiency of the mechanisms involved in the 
recognition of Imp_GW, by pondering regulatory 
solutions to minimize the degree of discretion 
associated with the timing and value of these 
losses and thereby improving the credibility of 
financial information.
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2 Literature Review
2.1	Big bath practices
Earnings management is associated 
with strategies to achieve benchmarks, namely 
the smallest variability in inter-period earnings 
(income smoothing), as a tool for managing 
shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ expectations, 
and the expectation of increasing future earnings 
(big bath accounting), following the penalization 
of present earnings. This paper analyzes negative 
earnings as an inducing factor of those practices. 
Several authors (Henning, Shaw & Stock, 
2004; Li & Sloan, 2017; Ramanna & Watts, 
2012; Riedl, 2004) analyze the recognition of 
Imp_GW in the context of managers’ discretion, 
namely the amount and time of such recognition, 
notably through big bath practices, associated with 
the use of non-current items to manage earnings 
in periods where they are significantly low. 
This strategy is justified by the expectation that 
markets do not penalize companies in proportion 
to their losses, because investors focus more on 
the future and companies signal to the market 
improvements obtained after a bad result (Jordan 
& Clark, 2004).
Walsh, Craig, and Clarke (1991) define 
big bath as the use of non-frequent items to adjust 
earnings and in situations of abnormal losses or 
gains, while Elliott and Shaw (1988) consider that 
big bath occurs when the impairment reported in 
special items represents more than 1 per cent of 
the accounting value of the assets. These practices 
are more likely in large companies than in small 
ones, although a big bath strategy has more impact 
on the latter (Sevin & Schroeder, 2005).
Li et al. (2011) found evidence of big 
bath practices that use Imp_GW being associated 
with the presence of negative earnings, while 
AbuGhazaleh, al-Hares, and Roberts (2011), 
Beatty and Weber (2006), and Jordan and 
Clark (2015) associate big bath practices with 
recent changes of Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). However, the hypothesis that earnings 
manipulation (big bath) is associated with a 
new CEO was not validated by Avallone and 
Quagli (2015), Jordan and Clark (2004, 2015), 
and Ramanna and Watts (2012). These authors 
concluded that impairment recognition is 
associated with other factors, namely the market’s 
perception or the effective deterioration of the 
assets. For example, Jordan and Clark (2004) 
conclude that companies recognized more Imp_
GW in 2002 probably because earnings were 
already diminished and the market would punish 
them relatively little if they were reduced. Van de 
Poel, Maijoor, and Vanstraelen (2009) conclude 
that impairment is recognized in periods where 
other losses are also recognized or in periods where 
earnings before impairment are relatively low, 
while Jahmani et al. (2010) suggest that managers 
manage the moment of Imp_GW recognition. 
In turn, Escribano (2015) and Francis, Hanna, 
and Vincent (1996) conclude that a history of 
Imp_GW recognition induces similar future 
behaviors.
In studies applied to Portuguese 
companies, Carvalho (2015) found evidence of 
big bath practices, while Castro (2012) did not 
find such practices. Alves (2013) confirmed the 
relevance of Imp_GW as a discretionary element 
of accruals. Escribano (2015) also concludes that 
these practices exist in Spanish companies.
Whereas the literature is not in agreement 
regarding the practice of using Imp_GW as 
an instrument for earnings manipulation, the 
following research hypothesis is considered: 
H1: The recognition of Imp_GW is associated 
with negative earnings before the Imp_GW, 
ceteris paribus.
2.2 Constraints to big bath practices
2.2.1	 Debt 
Several studies associate the tendency 
not to recognize impairment, in the context of 
earnings management, with this being able to 
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influence the debt capacity of companies, namely 
in the risk premium or in obtaining new loans 
(Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty & Weber, 2006; 
Riedl, 2004).
When GW and other intangibles have 
a significant weight in total assets, creditors 
do not ignore the information contained in 
those items (Beatty, Weber & Yu, 2008). The 
perception of credit risk may be flagged by 
debt-to-equity or liabilities-to-assets ratios. High 
levels of indebtedness encourage non-recognition 
of impairment in order not to increase those 
indicators and to avoid consequences in terms of 
debt negotiation. This behavior is not, however, 
generalizable. Beatty et al. (2002), for example, 
conclude that companies are willing to accept 
higher interest rates in order to maintain flexibility 
in their accounting options, thus weighing up 
other interests besides the cost of indebtedness 
alone, in particular those related to agency costs, 
litigation, or taxes (Beatty et al., 2008).
Other authors, notably AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011), Avallone and Quagli (2015), Beatty 
and Weber (2006), Godfrey and Koh (2009), 
Hamberg et al. (2011), Ramanna and Watts 
(2012), Vogt, Pletsch, Morás’s, and Klann (2016), 
and Zhang (2008), associate indebtedness with 
options in accounting policy. Beatty and Weber 
(2006) suggest companies are less susceptible 
to recognizing Imp_GW when they have less 
negotiating capacity and accounting changes 
affect credit agreements. Zhang (2008), in turn, 
analyzes the relationship between conservative 
accounting policies and credit agreements, 
noting that there are minor inequalities in 
more leveraged companies and that lenders 
offer lower interest rates to more conservative 
borrowers. However, the author considers that 
more conservative borrowers are the ones most 
likely to violate contracts as a result of negative 
impacts. Ramanna and Watts (2012) also 
confirm that Imp_GW decreases when changes 
to debt contracts are at risk.
The results on discretion in the recognition 
of Imp_GW and indebtedness are neither 
consensual nor robust. Godfrey and Koh (2009) 
concluded that managers use discretionary power 
to reduce hiring costs and found a meaningful 
but non-robust relationship there. Hamberg et 
al. (2011) also tested the relevance of the debt 
ratio in recognizing these losses and concluded it 
was not significant, which is explained by the fact 
that Swedish legislation restricts the compulsory 
payment of dividends and such restrictions reduce 
the unpredictability of debt repayment.
Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, and Magnan 
(2008) found negative relationships between 
both financial leverage and the need for funding 
and Imp_GW. These authors concluded that, in 
general, companies that increase debt or equity 
are not influenced by the fact that GW seems to 
be impaired. 
Abughazaleh et al. (2011) did not find a 
significant relationship between the debt ratio 
and the recognition of Imp_GW. This absence is 
explained by less information asymmetry between 
managers and financiers, which would create few 
incentives to manage results. More recent studies 
have found no relationship between indebtedness 
and earnings management practices that use 
Imp_GW (Avallone & Quagli, 2015; Oak, 2015; 
Vogt et al., 2016).
2.2.2	 Market value
As a rule, market value proxies are treated 
as dependent variables. However, Alciatore, 
Easton and Spear (2000), Elliot and Shaw (1988), 
Francis et al. (1996), Riedl (2004), and Vogt et 
al. (2016) consider market value as a potentially 
explanatory variable. Some authors argue that 
Imp_GW recognition obliges managers to 
disclose information about fair value and expected 
future cash flows, which leads to updated investor 
expectations for future returns (Chen et al., 2008; 
Jarva, 2009; Lee, 2011; Li et al., 2011).
The recognition criteria for goodwill 
impairment require unverifiable estimates of 
future cash flow or market values, which are 
susceptible to manipulation (Holthausen & 
Watts, 2001). However, if investors validate an 
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evaluation measure and reward managers based 
on that measure, the latter will tend to manipulate 
it for their own benefit (Watts, 2003). Henning 
et al. (2004) confirm this manipulation (delay 
in the recognition of Imp_GW and strategic 
revaluation) to obtain shareholder approval, 
linked to certain objectives. Francis et al. (1996) 
include the performance of the market price and 
the variation in the book-to-market indicator 
as proxies of the decision to impair, that is, 
impairment recognition (expecting a negative 
relationship). They conclude that companies with 
poor performance in the market recognize higher 
impairment losses.
Alciatore et al. (2000) analyze the 
relationship between the stock price and asset 
impairment. They find a greater correlation 
between impairment values and returns in the 
previous quarter than between impairment and 
returns in the same period. Thus, they conclude 
that impairment tends to be reported after a fall in 
the stock price, suggesting that the market already 
incorporates at least part of that information. 
Chen et al. (2008) obtain similar results. Riedl 
(2004) uses three market proxies (return by 
industry, return by company, and return variation) 
and finds a significant negative relationship with 
Imp_GW. 
Li and Sloan (2017) test the hypothesis 
that stock price correctly reflects all information 
about an inflated GW and its future devaluations. 
They test the value of shares in a previous period 
and in a current period, concluding that the 
decision to recognize Imp_GW is not a reflection 
of changes in estimated future cash flow, but 
rather a late response to a substantial extinction 
of GW benefits, already reflected by the market. 
In a study on Spanish listed companies, Giner and 
Pardo (2015) also use return (t-1) and market-to-
book as market proxies and find only a meaningful 
relationship with the latter. Carvalho (2015) 
find a significant negative relationship between 
market-to-book and the recognition of Imp_GW 
in Portuguese companies.
Considering the diversity of conclusions 
and that in a big bath policy the option of 
reducing earnings can be conditional on the 
degree of financial leverage and the anticipation 
of a reduction in market return, consequently 
penalizing shareholders, the following hypothesis 
is established:
H2: The big bath practices of companies 
with negative earnings before Imp _ GW are 
conditioned by indebtedness and the stock 
market, ceteris paribus.
3	Empirical study
This investigation follows a positivist 
approach (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990) and seeks 
causal relationships among potentially explanatory 
variables of Imp_GW recognition. In the context 
of this theory, accounting practices are guided by 
the interests of agents, who seek to maximize their 
well-being. Watts and Zimmermann (1990) point 
to regulation to regulation, the costs of producing 
information, compensation plans, the degree of 
indebtedness, and the political costs associated 
with the size of the companies, as factors that 
influence these practices.
3.1	Universe and sample
The research universe consists of 
companies with securities listed on the Lisbon 
and Madrid stock markets in the 2007-2015 
period. This choice is based on the greater demand 
for transparency imposed by the supervisory 
authorities. 
The historical influence of code law in 
both countries, compared to those of the common 
law tradition, is seen as a factor involving less 
protection of creditors and shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). At 
the same time, the corruption perception index 
in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015) places 
Portugal and Spain in 28th and 37th position, 
respectively, in the world ranking (16th and 
22nd, respectively, in the ranking of European 
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countries), which also suggests an environment 
with reduced legal protection.
Both countries have undergone several 
years of economic recession (2009-2013), with 
high unemployment, especially in Spain (in 
the order of 20%). Spain has a gross domestic 
product (2016) that places it in fifth position in 
the European Union (Eurostat, 2018) and 13th in 
the world ranking (Portugal in 46th), according 
to the World Bank (2018). As a result of the 
economic recession, combined with continued 
growth of public debt, Portugal was subjected 
to an economic and financial assistance program 
(2011-2014), which led to measures to promote 
greater budgetary rigor, stability of the markets, 
and financial and social spending cuts. While 
with a different degree of intervention, Spain 
also resorted to financial support to recapitalize 
its financial sector.
In terms of capitalization (World 
Federation of Exchanges, 2016), the difference 
between the two countries is the following: Spain 
is in 16th place in the world ranking and Portugal 
is in 48th.
A sample of 105 companies (35 Portuguese 
and 70 Spanish) is drawn from a universe of 53 
and 124 (in 2015), respectively. The financial 
sector and the sports sector are excluded, in 
order to enable the total comparability of the 
information. Companies with an International 
Securities Identification Number prefix different 
from PT or ES were also excluded. The data 
were directly and manually extracted from 
the consolidated reports and accounts of the 
companies, available on the online pages of the 
supervisory entities of the securities markets of 
Portugal and Spain.
The market data (stock prices) were 
obtained from www.bolsadelisboa.com.pt/ and 
www.bolsademadrid.es/. 
In the Imp_GW analysis, 11 companies 
were excluded due to not presenting GW in their 
balance sheets (one is Portuguese and 10 are 
Spanish). An unbalanced final panel was obtained, 
containing 826 observations.
3.2 Variables
Several studies have chosen Imp_GW as 
a dependent variable, using either the positive 
amount of goodwill impairments (primary or 
deflated by the value of assets or by sales) or 
a binary form, defined as recognition or non-
recognition of Imp_GW. The logarithmically 
transformed carrying amount was chosen in 
order to reduce the asymmetry within the sample. 
Logarithmic transformation of the variables is a 
common procedure in continuous variables, with 
the interval [0; + ∞ [, when used in economic/
financial studies. In this study, given the presence 
of the zero value (0), the transformation was 
performed with the expression ln(Imp_GW + 1).
The association between the recognition 
of Imp_GW in year t (Ln_imp_GWt) and in the 
previous year (t-1) is explored. Based on Beatty 
and Weber (2006), Elliot and Hanna (1996), 
Escribano (2015), and Francis et al. (1996), a 
positive association is expected between these 
two variables. The introduction of the dependent 
variable as independent violates the assumptions 
of exogenous regressors, and justifies the use of the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) rather 
than ordinary least squares estimation or fixed 
and random effects estimation using panel data.
Negative net earnings (RL_neg), 
before impairment, market return, and level of 
indebtedness are the variables of interest in this 
research. These variables are estimated for the 
whole sample, and are controlled by country and 
by industry (Industry Classification Benchmark, 
Level 1). The RL_neg variable intends to capture 
big bath practices that use Imp_GW recognition, 
in periods where earnings before such recognition 
are negative. The hypothesis is that in periods 
of bad economic crashes, the worsening of 
performance through Imp_GW is perceived 
by managers as having a minimal impact on 
stakeholders.
Market proxies, such as price to book value 
(PBV), stock returns (Ret), and return on equity 
(ROE), reflect investors’ expectations or indicate 
the ability to generate future cash flow. 
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PBV represents the relationship between 
market value per share and accounting value per 
share. It can be interpreted as a measure of the 
return of shares (Zhang, 2008) or as a proxy for 
future cash flow, so it is expected to be negatively 
associated with Imp_GW (e.g., Bamber & Cheon, 
1998). Other authors (e.g., AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2011) advocate a positive association between 
these variables. Ret is an external measure, which 
indicates the market return to shareholders and 
also the economic performance of a company 
(Francis et al., 1996; Godfrey & Koh, 2009) as 
well as its ability to generate future cash flows. 
Because Imp_GW signals the loss of capacity 
to generate future cash flows, this independent 
variable is expected to be negatively associated 
with Ret. Conversely, there is the following 
argument: managers tend to manage earnings in 
companies with low returns in order to disguise 
poor performance, so the association between 
market value per share and accounting value per 
share is positive. The Ret variable is included, 
for time t (share price on 31st December), as a 
potentially (explanatory) independent variable 
of Imp_GW to the extent that the closing of 
accounts is expected to be already affected by this 
market information, after accruals recognition. 
ROE is an accounting indicator of the company’s 
performance, so better performance means the 
need for Imp_GW recognition (AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2011; Chalmers, Godfrey & Webster, 
2011; Escribano, 2015; Giner & Pardo, 2015), 
therefore, a negative relationship between ROE 
and Imp_GW is expected.
Total assets/total liabilities (DEBT) 
for period t captures the relevance of financial 
leverage in decisions on Imp_GW. Because 
the theory suggests companies tend to increase 
earnings when financing-related negotiations are 
forthcoming, a negative relationship between 
DEBT and Imp_GW is expected (e.g. Ramanna 
& Watts, 2012).
In addition to the variables of interest, a 
set of control variables is considered. The GW 
variable identifies the relative weight of GW 
in total assets (GW_assets). GW’s deflation by 
total assets is justified to reduce the effect of 
the dimension asymmetry between the sample 
companies. A positive relationship between 
GW’s relative weight variable in total assets 
and the respective impairment is expected. 
Companies with higher GW values tend to 
report higher impairment values (Abughazaleh 
et al., 2011; Zhang, 2008). CEO remuneration 
(RV_CEO) intends to determine to what extent 
bonuses associated with economic performance 
(earnings) influence decisions on the recognition 
of Imp_GW. Managers have incentives to delay 
the recognition of losses, including those related 
to GW (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Ramanna and 
Watts, 2012), when this significantly effects 
their remuneration. A negative correlation 
between these variables is expected. Total assets 
(Ln_assets), BIG4, and Return on sales (ROS) are 
proxies for size, quality of auditing, and economic 
performance, respectively.
The public visibility of companies can 
soon encourage decreased earnings to reduce 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
Thus, a positive relationship between size and the 
dependent variable is expected. 
The BIG4 variable is used (Escribano, 
2015; Giner & Pardo, 2015) to refer to the quality 
of supervision, as a disincentive for earnings 
management by the administration, and with 
the capacity to predict customer bankruptcy 
more timely and with greater likelihood, and 
therefore the risk of litigation. This auditors 
variable is also associated with a more conservative 
accounting perspective (e.g., Xu, Carson, Fargher 
& Jiang, 2013), so a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable is expected. 
ROS reflects the relationship between 
sales and earnings, so a negative relationship 
between this variable and Imp_GW is expected, 
as companies tend to maximize return on sales 
(Abuaddous, Hanefah & Laili, 2014).
Table 1 lists the variables in the models to 
test, as well as their expected signs, and it lists the 
reference sources that support them theoretically 
and justify the selected proxies.
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Table 1.  
Independent variables
Variable Description Expected sign Reference
BIG4t Dummy: 1 if the auditor is a Big4, 0 otherwise +
Escribano (2015).
Giner & Pardo (2015).
Debtt
  R v. Bras. Gest. Neg. São Paulo v. 1 n.2 apr-mar. 2019  p.INCIAL-FINAL 
 
 
Variable Description Expected sign Reference 
BIG4t 
Dummy: 1 if the auditor is a Big4, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
Escribano (2015). 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Debtt      
                  
              
 - 
Avallone & Quagli (2015). 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Stenheim & Madsen (2016). 
GW_assetst           
   
             
 + 
Abughazaleh et al. (2011).  
Castro (2012). 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Rammana & Watt (2012).  
Zhang (2008). 
Ln_assetst 
Natural logarithm of net assets, deducted 
from GW in year t 
+ 
Avallone & Quagli (2015). 
Hamberg et al. (2011). 
∆PBVt 
       
          
                              
 
 
∆PBV =             
- 
Avallone & Quagli (2015).  
Brutting (2011).  
Francis et al. (1996).  
Stenheim & Madsen (2016). 
Rett 
    
       
    
 
Pt = Price on 31st December, year t. 
- 
Francis et al. (1996). 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Godfrey & Koh (2009). 
Rammana & Watts (2012). 
Stenheim & Madsen (2016). 
RL _negt 
Dummy: 1 if RL before Imp_GW is 
negative, 0 otherwise. 
+ 
Abuaddous et al. (2014). 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Godfrey & Koh (2009). 
Walsh et al. (1991). 
ROEt     
                     
                     
 
- Escribano (2015. 
Giner & Pardo (2015). 
Hamberg et al. (2011). 
ROSt     
                 
               
 
- Abuaddous et al. (2014). 
Jordan & Clark (2004, 2015). 
RV_CEOt 
 
CEO remuneration in year t 
- 
Stenheim & Madsen (2016). 
3.3 Models 
According to Baltagi (2005), many economic relationships are dynamic; that is, they 
contain tuning mechanisms. Therefore, to capture this aspect and at the same time solve the 
problems of endogeneity which are characteristic of this type of data, the research adopts the 
system GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), who showed that the system GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the simple difference GMM estimator, especially when the 
autoregressive parameter is moderately high and the number of temporal observations is 
relatively small. This model is based on a system consisting of two groups of equations: (i) 
equation with the variables in levels; (ii) equation defined in the first differences of these 
same variables.  
To study the two assumptions formulated, the following general model is defined: 
-
Avallone & Quagli (2015).
Giner & Pardo (2015).
Stenheim & Madsen (2016).
GW_assetst
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- 
Avallone & Quagli (2015).  
Brutting (2011).  
Francis et al. (1996).  
Stenheim & Madsen (2016). 
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All the estimates are carried out in two 
steps: (i) robust errors and collapse option 
(GMM), to deal with the proliferation problems 
of instruments that can lead to biased coefficients 
(Roodman, 2009a); (ii) the consistency of the 
estimates is validated using the Hansen and 
Arellano-Bond tests. Hansen’s test concerns 
restrictions on identification. The null hypothesis 
states that the instruments are valid, that is, not 
correlated with the error term, and that those 
instruments not included are correctly excluded 
from the estimated model. The Arellano-Bond test 
tests the hypothesis of the absence of second-order 
serial correlation in the error term.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Considering some of the relevant indicators 
for the study, it is worth noting (table 2) that, on 
average, the Spanish companies, compared to 
the Portuguese ones, present substantially higher 
indicators. This demonstrates the size imbalance 
between the countries.
In the system GMM method, as 
instruments we used the outdated Ln_imp_GW 
variables and the predetermined exogenous 
variables GW_assets, Ln_assets, RL_neg, Debt, 
and Ret. The year and BIG4 variables are 
considered as strictly exogenous.
The general model was estimated for the 
2007-2015 period and also for the 2007-2011 
and 2012-2015 sub-periods. These sub-periods 
respond to evidence obtained in the descriptive 
analysis, namely the magnitude of recognized 
Imp_GW (see comments to figures 1 to 4). 
The variables of interest RL_neg, Ret, and Debt 
were controlled by country and by industry, in 
order to capture the relevance of these structural 
components. 
From the general model, the model for 
verifying the second hypothesis is deduced. By 
replacing the Ret and Debt variables with the 
variables resulting from the interaction of the 
RL_neg with those variables, it enables it to be 
ascertained to what extent indebtedness and 
return are constraints on big bath practices. 
Table 2.  
Characterization of companies - Portugal versus Spain (2007-2015)
Variable (unit: 106€) Average Portugal Spain
Market value 3,314.4 1,430.0 4,389.1
Net earnings (before Imp_GW) 263.7 109.9 351.4
Market to Book 2.2 1.9 2.4
GW 831.2 303.9 1.132.0
Debt 0.709 0.739 0.692
Imp_GW 11.8 1.6 17.6
The percentage of companies recognizing 
Imp_GW is, on average, around 27%, reaching 
its highest proportion in 2011 (36%). In the 
remaining years, the percentage of recognition 
varies between 20% (2014) and 30% (2012). In 
percentage terms, the Portuguese companies are 
not substantially different from the Spanish ones as 
regards the recognition of Imp_GW. Considering 
the average values (€106), there are already 
significant differences between the countries, 
especially in the 2011-2014 period, where the 
Spanish companies present comparatively high 
values, which coincide with a higher percentage 
of companies with RL_neg, before Imp_GW, and 
a higher average amount of Imp_GW (table 3).
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Table 3.  
Recognition Imp_GW, Imp_GW, and RL_neg
Recognition/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
% Yes (sample) 23% 28% 26% 26% 36% 30% 26% 20% 25% 27%
Portugal (%) 21% 32% 25% 18% 41% 25% 27% 22% 25% 26%
Spain (%) 24% 26% 28% 31% 33% 31% 25% 18% 27% 27%
Average Imp_GW (106€) 0.7 3.7 3.2 3.8 13.2 18.1 30.4 22.2 4.3 11.1
Portugal (106€) 0.21 1.66 1.21 2.36 3.25 1.24 1.90 0.44 2.37 1.63
Spain (106€) 0.97 4.96 4.33 4.63 18.80 37.14 46.13 34.24 5.49 17.58
Firms RL_neg (%) 6% 20% 25% 22% 26% 36% 31% 22% 26% 24%
Portugal (%) 12% 32% 18% 12% 32% 35% 21% 25% 27% 24%
Spain (%) 3% 12% 28% 28% 22% 36% 37% 21% 25% 24%
The analysis of Imp_GW recognition 
by company shows that 38% never recognized 
goodwill impairments, and 12% only recognized 
them once. The practice of recognizing goodwill 
impairments is evident in most of the analyzed 
companies (62%). 
Figure 1. Imp_GW by country (2007-2015)
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The meaning of Imp_GW, a component 
of RL (Figure 1), is varied. In 2013 Imp_GW 
accounts for a considerable slice of RL (21.5%) 
for the Spanish companies but just 3.3% for the 
Portuguese ones. Additionally, Imp_GW as a 
percentage of GW presents different maximum 
values between the Spanish (4.4% in 2013) 
and Portuguese (1% in 2011) companies. The 
distribution of these impairments over the period 
suggests a diverse pattern of Imp_GW recognition 
between the companies in each country. While 
the Portuguese companies show few significant 
variations, the Spanish ones present a period of 
strong growth (2011-2014), returning to lower 
and similar levels to those of the Portuguese 
companies only in 2015.
The comparison of Imp_GW by country 
(Figure 1), considering its relative values in 
relation to Results and GW before Imp_GW, 
confirms that the Spanish companies present 
substantially higher values, with prominence in 
the 2011-2014 period. This cannot be exclusively 
due to the larger size of the Spanish companies. 
Differences between industries are 
identified. The highest percentage and the 
highest average amount of Imp_GW are observed 
in the services industry, while the consumer 
goods industry has the lowest percentage and 
lowest average value of Imp_GW. The consumer 
goods industry shows the lowest average value 
of GW (183 million euros), which may explain 
the respective impairments in the 2007-2015 
period. The technology and manufacturing 
industries present substantially higher average 
GW values (about 2.5 billion euros) but their 
impairment levels are below the average. This 
may be associated with the larger amounts and 
frequencies of Imp_GW in the service industry 
due to the specificity of investments in this 
industry, which are possibly more exposed to 
market contingencies of the business.
An analysis of the behavior of market 
returns and Imp_GW (Figure 2) suggests the 
existence of two sub-periods. Initially, there is 
evidence of an inverse relationship, as Imp_GW 
increases when market return decreases (2008-
2011), but later increases in Imp_GW are 
associated with a recovery of market value (2012-
2014). In general, the data suggest that Imp_GW 
recognition and market value are interconnected 
variables, with a negative relationship being 
expected. In the 2011-2012 sub-period there is 
an association between increased Imp_GW and 
increased return, suggesting that capital markets 
can receive the recognition of high losses without 
reflecting them in the share prices, at least initially. 
The detailed analysis by country does not identify 
very different patterns of returns, but instead 
regarding Imp_GW, which is explained by the 
magnitude of the Spanish companies (Figure 1).
Figure 2. Evolution of Imp_GW (106€) and Ret (2007-2015)
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Turnover (Figure 3) presents no major 
oscillations in behavior and does not reflect a 
crisis context in any visible way. However, when 
associated with significant decreases in results 
(before Imp_GW), turnover presents a negative 
variation, except for 2009-2008, 2013-2012, 
and 2014-2013. The increase in Imp_GW 
accompanies the years of higher reductions in 
results and, thus, indicates big bath practices.
Figure 3. Turnover, RL, and Imp_GW (2007-2015) (106€)
Throughout the analyzed time horizon, 
the Portuguese companies are more leveraged 
than the Spanish ones, only surpassed in 2013 
and 2014 by the latter, and coinciding with higher 
amounts of Imp_GW (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Debt (Percentage) and Imp_GW (106€) (2007-2015)
The analysis of Imp_GW recognition 
suggests the existence of two distinct sub-periods. 
The frontier is in 2011/2012, and is strongly 
influenced by the behavior of the Spanish 
companies.
4.2 Model analysis
Table 4 presents a summary of the 
significant results of the estimated regression 
models. These models test the two assumptions 
stated in section 2. 
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Table 4.  
Results of the estimated models
Variables
Periods Sub periods
2007-2015 2007-2011  2012-2015
Imp_GWt-1   0.2239** 0.3623** ---
RL_negt 0.4704* --- 0.1537**
RL_negt (Country)
Portugal --- --- ---
Spain 0.7528* --- 0.8940**
RL_negt (Industry)
 
Manufacturing 1.2756* 2.6394* ---
Consumer goods -2.9203* --- ---
Services --- --- 1.8777*
Energy --- --- ---
Technology --- -- 4.4598*
Debtt 0.4702** --- 0.3679*
Debtt (RL_neg) 0.8196** --- 0.9681**
Debtt  (Country)
Portugal --- --- ---
Spain 0.4890** --- 0.3389*
Debtt (Industry)
Manufacturing 2.2949** --- ---
Consumer goods --- --- ---
Services --- --- ---
Energy --- --- ---
Technology 7.950* --- 6.3028*
   
Rett 0.1109* -0.3162* 0.1537**
Rett (RL_neg) --- -2.5933** 0.1265**
Rett (Country)
Portugal --- --- ---
Spain 0.1217* --- 0.1597 **
Rett (sector)
Manufacturing --- --- 0.1140**
Consumer goods --- --- ---
Services 0.3201** --- 0.986**
Energy --- --- ---
Technology --- --- ---
ROEt --- --- ---
∆PBVt --- --- ---
GW_assets t   3.6530** 9.2167** ---
Ln_assetst 0.5922** 0.5709** 0.4939**
ROSt 0.0049** 0.2625** 0.0050*
BIG4t   -1.9218** --- ---
RV_CEOt --- --- ---
# Observations   721 333 265
# Groups 94 93 94
# Instruments 88 56 84
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2) 93.05 (0.000) 82.28 (0.000) 59.52 (0.000)
Hansen test (Prob>chi2) 79.28 (0.376) 52.67 (0.174) 76.60 (0.333)
Arellano-Bond test (Prob>z)       
AR (2)
AR (1) -3.42 (0.001) -2.22 (0.027) -1.83 (0.068)
-0.63 (0.528) -1.63 (0.104) -0.55 (0.582)
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01
The results in the various models (table 4) are consistent with the sign and meaning of the generality 
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of variables. A positive and significant association 
is observed in t and t-1 regarding Imp_GW 
recognition. This finding is in line with Escribano 
(2015) and Francis et al. (1996), who concluded 
that a history of Imp_GW recognition induces 
similar behaviors in the future. Another reason 
that may explain this positive relationship is the 
delay between the recognition of goodwill losses 
and the reduction in the value of the underlying 
asset, allowing managers flexible recognition at the 
most convenient time. Considering the two sub-
periods analyzed, it is noted that this relationship 
is only significant in the 2007-2012 period, 
suggesting that in the following sub-period other 
determinant factors overlap.
As far as H1 is concerned, the results 
confirm the positive explanatory capacity of 
RL_neg for the recognition of Imp_GW (p < 
0.001). According to Li et al. (2011), this suggests 
the presence of big bath practices with special 
incidence in the 2012-2015 sub-period, in the 
Spanish companies, when there was an elevated 
number of companies with negative earnings 
(before Imp_GW); this is coincident with higher 
values of Imp_GW. In four industries, RL_neg 
is explanatory. RL_neg is positively associated 
with Imp_GW in the manufacturing, services, 
and technology industries. However, the opposite 
is observed in the consumer goods industry, 
suggesting different practices when faced with 
bad results.
Regarding the relationship between 
Imp_GW recognition and market variables, only 
Ret is a statistically significant variable. A negative 
relationship between Imp_GW recognition and 
Ret is observed in the 2007-2011 sub-period, 
followed by a positive relationship in the next 
sub-period. This result suggests that companies 
are sensitive to market signals, whether they 
penalize impairment losses, or they minimize 
their impacts. In the first sub-period the expected 
(negative) ratio is confirmed; that is, market 
value decreases are associated with impairment 
increases. However, these impairment increases 
correspond to relatively low average values, 
indicating that the market anticipates future 
losses in a context of economic depression. In the 
2012-2015 sub-period, a positive relationship is 
observed, and only in the Spanish companies. In 
line with Alciatore et al. (2000), the results suggest 
that Imp_GW tends to be reported after a fall 
in the stock price. This suggests that the market 
already incorporates part of that unfavorable 
information.
Concerning the analysis restricted to 
the manufacturing and services industries, a 
significant positive relationship is observed, these 
being the two industries where big bath practices 
were previously identified. These results support 
the conclusions of Henning et al. (2004), Li and 
Sloan (2017), Ramanna and Watts (2012), Riedl 
(2004), and Watts (2003), suggesting that the 
recognition of Imp_GW is a discretionary act of 
managers, in terms of the amount and time of 
the recognition, and thus adjustable to market 
behavior.
There is a positive, unanticipated 
association between debt and Imp_GW, which 
suggests that indebtedness is not a restriction on 
the recognition of these losses. This relationship 
is significant only for the Spanish companies (also 
found by Escribano (2015), but not significant) 
and in the technology and manufacturing 
industries and, in particular, in the 2012-
2015 sub-period. These results contradict the 
assumption of positive accounting theory, but, 
like in Beatty et al. (2002), it may be concluded 
that companies are willing to accept higher 
interest rates to maintain flexibility in their 
accounting options. 
A positive relationship between Imp_GW 
and company size (Ln_assets, as a proxy) is the 
association expected and has been found in many 
studies. The relationship found in this research 
suggests that, in the context of discretionary use 
of big bath practices, these are more likely to be 
used in large companies than in smaller ones, 
which seems to confirm the results of Elliott 
and Shaw (1988). Sevin and Schroeder (2005) 
suggest that using big bath has a greater impact 
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on small companies, compared to larger ones, so 
these extended effects may impose restrictions 
on the use of such practices. The Size variable 
can explain the non-evidence of big bath in the 
Portuguese companies, given that the relative size 
of these companies is much lower than that of the 
Spanish ones.
The BIG4 variable is negatively associated 
with the recognition of Imp_GW. The presence of 
big bath practices can explain this unanticipated 
relationship, and suggests opportunistic behaviors 
in the absence of these auditors. Artur, Tang, 
and Lin (2015) analyzed the use of discretionary 
accruals, including Imp_GW, as an earnings 
management tool and also observed this negative 
relationship.
The positive relationship between ROS 
(before Imp_GW) and the dependent variable is 
also contrary to expected. It is deduced that, in 
the context of big bath practices, the margin in 
sales is sacrificed in favor of the objectives that lie 
in this type of strategy. 
Analyzing the market and indebtedness in 
the recognition of Imp_GW in companies with 
RL_neg (H2) reveals a pattern equal to that of 
the total sample, in terms of big bath practices. 
Indebtedness is not confirmed as a factor in 
adopting these practices, while the market is 
confirmed as such (negative relationship) in the 
2007-2011 sub-period and is not confirmed 
as such in the 2012-2015 sub-period (positive 
relationship), as explained above.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the recognition of 
goodwill impairment (Imp_GW) as a big bath 
strategy, as well as any restrictions on this policy. 
The research is based on a sample of companies 
with shares listed on the Lisbon and Madrid stock 
markets in the 2007-2015 period, which includes 
years of economic recession (2009-2013) in both 
countries, Portugal and Spain.
It is noted that 38% of the companies 
never recognized Imp_GW throughout the 
years from 2007 to 2015, but the positive and 
meaningful association between IMP_GWt and 
Imp_GWt-1 reflects the predisposition towards 
such recognition when there is already such 
an experience. This conclusion is in line with 
previous findings by Escribano (2015) and Francis 
et al. (1996).
Imp_GW seems to play a relevant role 
in big bath practices in companies with negative 
earnings. This result corroborates the existence 
of high discretion in the use of non-recurring 
accruals, and is consistent with the conclusions of 
Li et al. (2011). The negative relationship between 
the BIG4 variable and goodwill impairment 
suggests practices that go against credible 
accounting, so large audit companies do not seem 
to be able to discourage these practices.
In the analysis for the 2007-2011 and 
2012-2015 sub-periods, big bath practices are 
only significant in the latter, and only for Spanish 
companies.  These coincide with the highest 
percentage of companies with negative earnings, 
corrected by Imp_GW, and with the highest 
amount of these losses. The fact that only the 
Spanish companies have significant relationships 
regarding big bath practices or the impact of 
market and debt variables may be explained by 
the fact that they are, on average, larger than 
the Portuguese ones (the former are about 2.5 
times larger in turnover and approximately three 
times bigger in stock market capitalization than 
the latter) and have a higher average amount of 
Imp_GW (about 11 times) concentrated in this 
specific period. On the other hand, the RL_neg 
indicates that although size attracts greater 
public exposure, these companies tend to have 
a greater capacity to minimize the impact of the 
recognition of these losses. This confirms one of 
the assumptions of positive accounting theory 
that associates company size with policies that 
manipulate accounting and tend to sacrifice 
present results for the sake of future profits.
The various industries do not present 
homogeneous behavior regarding the relationship 
between RL_neg and Imp_GW. The consumer 
goods industry stands out with a negative 
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relationship between the two variables, suggesting 
the non-penalizing of results by Imp_GW. This 
is interpreted as being due to the nature of the 
diverse activities, particularly the exposure of 
investments to specific and systemic risks, which 
are aggravated in times of crisis.
Additionally, this research analyzed to 
what extent debt and the capital market are 
constraints to big bath practices in companies 
with RL_neg. The positive relationship found 
between indebtedness and Imp_GW suggests 
that any penalties for creditors do not affect the 
recognition of goodwill impairments, nor do they 
limit big bath practices. Although several of these 
companies are financed with publicly traded debt 
instruments, funding by credit institutions plays 
an important role, and these large companies 
have significant negotiating power, so they are 
not severely affected by occasional bad results. 
The relationship between the level of indebtedness 
and Imp_GW is only positive and significant 
in the Spanish companies, suggesting that the 
differences in size influence negotiating power 
with relation to creditors. These results contradict 
the assumption of positive accounting theory, 
but as found by Beatty et al. (2002), it can be 
concluded that companies are willing to accept 
higher interest rates to maintain flexibility in their 
accounting options.
The study included years of crisis (2009-
2013), but also years of economic recovery (2014-
2015) and capital market recovery (2012-2013), 
in its examination of the relationship between the 
Ret variable and Imp_GW in companies with 
negative earnings. Different situations were found 
in the two sub-periods, 2007-2011 and 2012-
2015. While in the former there is a negative 
(expected) relationship between market signals 
and the recognition of Imp_GW; in the later 
sub-period there is a positive relationship, where 
a significant reduction in results is combined with 
recovery in market return. The big bath practices 
occurred in an environment where, on the one 
hand, the market does not penalize Imp_GW 
and, on the other, companies manage Imp_GW 
in line with the expected reactions of the market. 
In agreement with the conclusions of Alciatore et 
al. (2000), this research suggests that Imp_GW 
losses tend to be reported after a fall in the stock 
price because the capital market has already 
incorporated them, at least in part.
There is evidence of opportunistic earnings 
management, in addition to the accounting choice 
that international financial reporting standards 
permit (Libby, Rennekamp & Seybert, 2015; 
McEnroe & Sullivan, 2014). 
The results obtained refer to a temporal 
horizon that includes years of economic depression, 
which may have influenced the behavior of the 
companies in terms of their recognition of 
Imp_GW, and no other factors were identified as 
facilitators or inhibitors of earnings management, 
notably variables related to corporate governance 
and more detailed information on the cash 
generating units, which should be considered in 
future studies.
The results indicate that the internal and 
external accounting control mechanisms are 
not effective in preventing and controlling the 
opportunistic use of accounting policies as an 
instrument for manipulating the accounting truth 
when faced with certain objectives. This study 
contributes to the literature because it analyzes 
factors (indebtedness and market) as potential 
constraints on big bath practices and suggests that 
the accounting and financial reporting standard-
setters should consider alternatives that minimize 
the discretionary power of managers.
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